Keith Wolahan MP Address to the Robert Menzies Institute on the 70th anniversary of the Korean War truce

Good evening, everyone.

Thank you, Georgina Downer, the Board, staff, and all of you.

I’d also like to acknowledge some special guests, including Korean Consul General, Changhoon Yi, United States Vice Consul, Tom Chidiac, former members and ministers David Kemp and Fran Bailey.

As the Member for the seat named after Sir Robert Menzies, it is a particular honour for me to be here. This institute is more than a library and museum.  Your mission is to uphold and promote Sir Robert’s legacy by encouraging debate, learning, and inquiry. That is a mission we should all turn our mind to.  Too often, important public discussions have a threshold contest – whether the debate can even occur. That threshold contest requires courage and conviction: to walk past an angry protest, to ignore those who question your motives rather than your ideas, to risk being shunned by colleagues, or even an employer.

Before I turn to the topic at hand, I want to reflect upon something of consequence from last Saturday.  Australian scientists located the wreck of a ship that was sunk 80 years ago off the coast of the Philippines.

Resting at twice the depth of the Titanic, the Montevideo Maru was a Japanese merchant vessel used to transport prisoners of war.  It was torpedoed in 1942 by a US Submarine, whose crew, in the fog of war, were oblivious to its passengers.

It sank in 11 minutes, with the loss of 1000 Australians.  In 11 minutes, we lost twice the number killed in the entire Vietnam war.  In 11 minutes, entire bloodlines were wiped out, with the Turner family from NSW losing all three sons.  In 11 minutes, young men were woken as the explosion roared and the water rushed in.

They almost certainly tried their best to solve the problem, to find a way out.  But at some point, hope would have faded. We can only imagine what their final thoughts were. We can be sure they were of their parents, their siblings, their partners, and for some, their children. We can be sure they turned their last thoughts to home: to Australia.  That is why on every ANZAC Day, we gather at dawn to say: “lest we forget.”

But as the sun comes up, we must honour their legacy in a more substantial way.  To turn our minds to the lessons of conflict, so that we may learn and adapt.  That is our duty, and it is a serious one.

The Korean War is often overshadowed by the two conflicts that sit either side of it: World War II and the Vietnam War. For this reason, it has received the moniker, “The forgotten war”. No war should be forgotten, not least one of such significance.

A newspaper headline for this address would read something like this: Cold war becomes hot; Australia moves closer to the US. Perhaps I could leave it there and call for questions.

If we move past the headline, the opening paragraphs would give us better context: That in 1950, North Korean units invade South Korea, without provocation. With the Soviet Union absent from New York to exercise a veto, the United Nations Security Council called for military intervention. Australia answered that call, was there at the end, and in doing so, helped secure ANZUS.  I could ask for questions there, but it would be missing crucial context – the role played by our Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, who was Prime Minister throughout the three-year war.

This address will outline how the actions Menzies took in the Korean War continue to shape Australia’s foreign policy and defence strategy to this day. They will also shape our future.

What led to our decision to participate in another conflict far from home?

The short answer is insecurity.

Through the late 1940s, Australia was still reflecting upon the trauma of a second World War. Conflict in the pacific shook our sense of security.  How were we to defend an isolated island continent with a small population?  We were, as we are now, a strong, hardy nation. We were known for our ability to punch above our weight. But we lacked the population and industry required for self-sufficient defence.

Australia needed allies to survive. There were two schools of thought.  The first was liberal internationalism. This was largely championed by the Labor government of Ben Chiefly – Menzies’ immediate predecessor.

For liberal internationalists, the key to peace lay in three key elements: diplomacy, multilateral alliances, and international organisations (primarily the United Nations and the economic institutions of Bretton Woods).

Robert Menzies was wary of the consequences of appeasement in the 1930’s, believing liberal internationalism risked repeating those mistakes. He described it as “naïve”, “dangerously utopian” and offering “enlightened arbitration, not lasting security”.

Menzies was not one to criticise without offering an alternative. Menzies offered realism. Realism broadly seeks to understand the world as it is, not as it should be; one that places a premium on states, power, and interests.

When it came to security, Menzies prioritised bilateral agreements based on mutual defence.  And Menzies had a preferred bilateral partner in mind: Great Britain. Menzies was “British to his bootstraps” and an ardent anglophile. He would remain so all his life.

Menzies was also a pragmatist. In the aftermath of World War II, the British presence in Asia was dwindling. With Britain shifting its focus to eastern Europe, Menzies needed to turn to a new partner: The United States.

At the time, America was experiencing a golden age. It stood as a superpower without peer, with a significant naval capability. Most importantly, the United States placed the Asia-Pacific firmly within its sphere of influence.

Despite this, Menzies was still reluctant to turn to the United States. He saw such an action as capable of weakening the Anglo-Australian alliance. The United States was also reluctant. President Truman was unwilling to offer mutual defence agreements to any nation which could not offer strategic assets in return. And so, the status quo remained.  Until Korea forced our hand.

How did Australia come to join the war?

The leadup to the Korean War requires its own lecture, but for our purposes, hostilities began on 25 June 1950, when formations from Kim Il Sung’s Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. Two days later, with the support of UN Security Council Resolutions 82 and 83, President Truman announced the United States would be leading a task force of willing nations. It is important to note that the resolutions were able to pass without veto because the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN for recognising the Republic of China as China.

Menzies was reluctant to join the war. He was concerned with the more pressing communist insurgency in Malaya. The distant nature of this conflict weighed on him.  That said, Menzies, like Truman, understood that the post war rules-based order needed to be enforced. If not enforced, and if North Korea succeeded, it would open the door to a “domino effect”. Menzies was especially concerned about a future invasion of Hong Kong.  By way of compromise, Menzies committed two Australian warships and a RAAF squadron to the UN force being formed to defend South Korea.

Some believed Menzies should have gone further, including Minister for External Affairs, Sir Percy Spender (grandfather of the current Member for Wentworth). Like Menzies, Spender believed establishing an alliance with the United States was critical to the future security of Australia. But Spender wanted ground troops in Korea. He had the foresight to see that the war provided Australia with (and I quote): “an opportunity of cementing friendship with the United States which may not easily present itself again”. Menzies declined.  For Menzies, if Britain wasn’t in, Australia was out.

The situation changed while Menzies was on a ship to America. Spender was informed that British Prime Minister Clement Atlee had decided to commit ground troops to Korea. Spender lobbied for Australian ground troops to join the conflict before the British made their announcement. By late July 1950, Spender was successful.  Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden committed ground troops to the war.

All this occurred without the knowledge of Robert Menzies. Despite this, Menzies owned the decision.  Seizing the opportunity, he used it to cement Australia’s “common cause” with the United States. It is hard to imagine an acting Prime Minister making any such decision now.  Maybe they could claim the Wi-Fi was down.

And so, late September 1950, Australian troops set foot in Korea.  Over 18,000 Australians would serve in the Korean War, and 339 of them paid the ultimate price, joining 36,574 US personal who were killed in action. It was a brutal conflict, fought in difficult terrain and harsh weather conditions.  But despite these challenges, our soldiers fought bravely and with distinction, including in battles that became legendary, like Kapyong and Maryang-san.

They also engaged in humanitarian work, helping to rebuild schools and hospitals, and providing medical aid to civilians in need. Lasting bonds were formed with the Korean people, and their legacy is still remembered today.

The Korean War saw massive amounts of terrain lost, fought for, and regained, many times over.  This is one of the reasons this war has a disproportionately high civilian casualty rate, with approximately three million civilians losing their lives.  Major cities were destroyed, and thousands of massacres occurred.

The fighting ended after three years on 27 July 1953, with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement.  The Agreement created the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and allowed the return of prisoners.  No peace treaty was signed, and the two nations are technically still at war.   This hit home to me, when in 2013, I deployed to South Korea to participate in Exercise Ulchi-Freedom, a combined exercise between the United States and South Korea.  The exercise is one of the largest and longest running in the world.  It has been run annually since 1968, when North Korean special forces launched a raid to assassinate the president of South Korea at his official residence, the Blue House.  North Korea criticises the exercise as being in preparation for war, and South Korea and the United States counterclaim that its purpose is to prevent war.

What is the legacy of the war?

The war in Korea was unpopular at its end. The lack of a true end to the conflict led to disaffection. Many soldiers felt they fought for nothing.  For our national interest, Sir Percy Spender was proven correct.  Australia’s decisive committal of troops convinced the United States we were “doing our part” in the region. As a consequence, perhaps a direct one, the ANZUS treaty was signed on 1 September 1951.

Under the agreement, Australia, New Zealand (at the time), and the United States pledged as follows: to assist each other through mutual aid, and to collectively develop their capacity to resist armed attack. Critically, “an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties”. Simply put, Australia’s security was to be guaranteed by the United States.

I stress the critical role of the Korean Conflict in this development. Professor John Blaxland notes, the United States would have been “unwilling” to sign a mutual security treaty without the “prompt contribution of air and land forces to Korea.”

The office of the Historian at the US Department of State notes the following: “several developments in 1949 and 1951 helped to change U.S. perceptions about the utility of a formal security agreement…. In the 1950s, the outbreak of the Korean War led Australia and New Zealand to commit troops through the United Nations alongside the NATO allies, demonstrating both their concern over the threat of communism and their commitment to doing their part to help contain it in the region”.

ANZUS marked the adoption of the United States as our primary defence partner. Although, this was not the end of the Anglo-Australian relationship.  Menzies understood that “power and dynamism” lay in the United States.  But to him, it was Britain that had the “maturity and expertise” so valuable in a time of crisis.

Douglas MacArthur’s decision through the war to advance to the Yalu River made Menzies nervous about complete reliance on the US. And so, Menzies continued to nurture our relationship with Britain. We followed the British into Malaya and Rhodesia, and British nuclear testing occurred in Maralinga. Britain remained fully engaged in our region until 1970. This year was marked by British withdrawal west of the Suez. The United States then stood alone as our primary defence partner.

The tilt from Albion to America, begun by the actions the Menzies government took in 1950, was complete. This was an immense shift. A new ally, a new direction.

What is best for Australia: alliance, or self-reliance?

The war in Korea did not just shape who our allies were. It shaped their role in Australia’s future. That long-held question of alliance or self-reliance received an answer.

Menzies ultimately sided firmly with alliance, and it was the Korean War that led him to this conclusion. Menzies had known for a long time the pitfalls of self-reliance. Independent defence policy is, was, and always will be, a hugely expensive endeavour.

The Korean War demonstrated we had another option. Joint military deployments with great powers worked.  Menzies believed he saw the future of Australian defence. He stated Australian forces “would only operate in close collaboration” with our “great and powerful friends” into the future.  Regarding self-reliance, he “explicitly ruled it out”.

This re-defined the objectives of Australian foreign and defence policy. Australia’s primary defence objective was now to keep the US and UK engaged in South-East Asia. Our military and diplomatic resources were devoted to this objective, from Korea onwards.

The reaction of the United States to Australia’s involvement in Korea made something clear. Our allies will be willing to defend us if we provided them with moral and tangible military support when they need it. And only if we do this. Korea fundamentally intermeshed Australian foreign and defence policy. We helped achieve these foreign policy goals through defence initiatives.

How did the ADF change after Korea?

The ADF was to be at the centre of this new foreign policy. It was to become a tool of diplomacy, not self-defence. Australia’s primary security objective was to keep our allies on side. Our security forces were key to this.

The logic was simple. Our “great and powerful friends” will intervene here with us, if the ADF intervenes “there” with them, wherever there may be. Leaving aside the intervention of East Timor, Australia has not fought in a conflict without the UK or US since. And even in East Timor, the US had marines stationed at short notice offshore.  An important signal that they were there if we needed.

Foreign interventions can act like “insurance premiums”. But do they have to be all consuming national endeavours? Korea proved even small but meaningful deployments could make a difference. Just 18,000 soldiers were what it took for the United States to pledge support to our defence. Menzies recognised this cost/benefit ratio. In the years following Korea, Australia continued to send small, diplomatically significant contingents to foreign conflicts alongside our partners.

This new strategy required a new ADF. Quality over quantity meant professional soldiers, trained and equipped as professionals. To follow our partners where they went, meant globally deployable forces and interoperability was key. As Menzies stated, the ADF should “standardise so far was we can with the Americans”. In summary, the ADF was changed into the highly mobile, highly trained, well-equipped force we know it to be today. We owe this in part to the lessons of Korea.

How can we summarise the lessons of Korea?

I would like to highlight three.

First, the Korean War proved foreign interventions are rational, but they require the legitimacy of public support. They make sense because they strengthen our alliances. Strong alliances prevent the need for self-reliance. That is something policy makers can be honest about. Australians get it. Our alliances don’t just make our self-defence more cost effective; they make our budgets work. This is all well understood. The public knows this. It is no surprise that more than 70% of Australians support AUKUS.

But our alliances can only be maintained if we continue to support our partners. Participation in foreign interventions is how we demonstrate this support. This is not at always popular. Policymakers must better explain and articulate the importance of foreign interventions to our alliances, and our security.

The second lesson is that succeeding in conflict requires fixed objectives. The first half of the Korean conflict was a tactical success. In a few months, coalition forces pressed North Korean troops back to the 38th parallel. South Korea was saved from communist aggression, the objective of the UN intervention was achieved. Back in the United States, a prominent radio host declared “Victory in Korea”.

It was at this point that US commanders shifted objectives. The US wished to eliminate the communist presence on the peninsula. General MacArthur was authorized to fight until the Yalu River. This would prove to be disastrous. The push the drew China into the conflict. The Western public was also disillusioned by the continuation of the invasion, which was, to them, no longer in defence of democracy, freedom, and international rule of law, but in pursuit of crushing an enemy.

The war continued until 1953, with countless increases in casualties. The Yalu River advance was poorly thought out in two respects: it disregarded the reaction of China, and it disregarded the moral reasoning behind the original intervention. Strategic goals are a matter of national policy.  If not articulated and enforced, operational commanders may not know when to stop, and the public forgets what it is fighting for.

The third lesson is this: how a war ends matters just as much, if not more than, how it was fought.

This does not mean we prefer armistice to genuine peace. But it does mean we prefer armistice to giving up.

The Korean War has not ended. It remains in a tense armistice. But there is peace. There is victory in stability. It is possible for two sides in a conflict to divide up a piece of land, and live side by side in relative peace. Neither side surrendered, neither compromised their core beliefs, but peace, though tense stability, is present.

Can I contrast this with the end of the Afghanistan war and the fall of Kabul?  On any measure this has been a disaster – for the people of Afghanistan, peace, and those who sacrificed for the hope of something better.

Afghanistan was an unwinnable war. The Taliban could not and would not be vanquished. But that did not mean the entire nation had to be handed over to a group that drew its legitimacy from only a portion of the population. Instead, the more liberal Kabul, and ethnically diverse provinces to the north, are now ruled by a regime that does not recognise or tolerate their wishes to live life differently.

Forever wars are not appealing, but I wonder what a small enduring presence might have achieved for the people of Afghanistan; perhaps a negotiated path to federation, where the diverse people could find a way to live and let live.

And in the same way that the US presence in Korea continues to send a signal to deter aggressive acts, abandoning Afghanistan sent the reverse signal, arguably giving comfort to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.  Donald Rumsfeld was wrong about many things, but right to state that “weakness is provocative”.

To conclude…

The Korean War profoundly shapes our defence and foreign policy as we find it today. The Menzies Government saw an opportunity and took it. Because of that, we find ourselves in a strong and stable alliance with the United States. It is because of this alliance, that we have a small, nimble, highly trained, and highly sophisticated defence force.

The legacy of the Korean War can be found at all levels, from AUKUS meetings to the weapons Australian soldiers use on the battlefield. Korea taught us that Alliances are won at a cost. We must treasure and nurture them. Because in the end, we should be judged upon what we do, not what we say.

If we were to return to the newspaper metaphor, and rhetorically ask this question: “was it worth it?”, I think of something an Afghanistan veteran said to me in 2021.  He said the fall of Kabul caused him to question why we were there. But he added this months later: maybe, maybe what we did helped get us AUKUS.  He said he can be proud of that.  We could say the same to Korean veterans; that their sacrifice helped get us ANZUS.  And in both ways, they help keep our nation secure.

But there is a legacy for Korea that we can be particularly proud of, and I think the newspaper would answer it with one picture: the Korean peninsula at night. It is a picture taking from space by NASA. On the South is a nation of 50 million people that is free and prosperous, beaming bright.  On the North is a nation of 25 million people, imprisoned and in total darkness, save for a few sprinkles of light that house the elite.  That alone is a legacy that was worth fighting for, and one we can all be proud of.