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Copy specific notes

Bookplate inserted; small slip of paper affixed to front endpaper typed: “From Mrs Elaine Roe”. Numerous highlights made in pencil throughout text, including on: [pp. 52 – 53] the agreement between Britain and Egypt made on 27 July 1954 (p. 52 also earmarked); [p. 60] Article 8 of the peace agreement between United Kingdom, Northern Island and the Egyptian Government; [pp. 82 – 83] the role of India and its relationship with the Commonwealth (p. 82 also earmarked); [pp. 85 – 90] the construction of the Aswan Dam (p. 88 also earmarked); [pp. 95 – 102] the speech of Nasser proclaiming Egyptian sovereignty and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal (p. 95 also earmarked); [p. 106] State Department adviser, Mr. H. Phleger; [pp. 108 – 109] ongoing peace negotiations; [p. 111] the views of former United States’ Secretary of State, Mr Dulles; [p. 113] “Australia and New Zealand identified themselves rapidly and fully with the United Kingdom; Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, who had been in Washington when the crisis began, was to become one of its key figures as it developed. He was shrewd and forthright, and aware of the full purport and implications of Nasser’s challenge as soon as it was made.”; [p. 114] the desire of Mr. Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon to bring Western Powers to a settlement with Nasser in order to “destroy the last remnants of British and French prestige, moral influence and authority through Asia and Africa” (also written “NB” in margin); [p. 115] the invitations to the London conference; [pp. 116 – 117] the suggestion of using force in the Suez Canal dispute (also written “NB” in margin); [pp. 118 – 119] Egyptian sovereignty; [p. 120] the misrepresentation of the affair in the British newspapers; [p. 122] Mr. Gaitskell not viewing armed force as necessary; [pp. 123 – 124] Menzies’ television broadcast speech in London and his words: “we cannot accept either the morality or the legality of what Nasser has done.”; [p. 125] on Russia being willing to “back Egypt to the verge of war”; [pp. 127 – 128] the role of Israel in the London Conference; [p. 130] Australia being a signatory to the Convention; [p. 144 earmarked] parliamentary deliberations; [p. 148 earmarked] restraint from aggression; [p. 154 earmarked] general diplomatic activity following the conference; [p. 163 earmarked] the resolution submitted by the Security Council; [p. 165] the views of Anthony Nutting (p. 165 also earmarked); [p. 173] the Eden Government setting out to mislead the United States (p. 173 also earmarked); [p. 195 earmarked] the ‘Hunt’ Class destroyer; [p. 198 earmarked] the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution of 1950.