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Stamped on front endpaper: “Robert Menzies”. Highlighted text in pencil on Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd. v. New South Wales case includes: “The legislative power of the Commonwealth to affect air navigation arises under s. 51 (i.) of the Constitution to make laws with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among the States but it also may arise under the power to make laws with respect the external affairs (s. 51 (xxix). Obviously power in relation to trade and commerce with other countries as well as trade and commerce among the States naturally introduces questions of the safety of the terminals and that involves some degree of regulation of air traffic which comes to those terminals wherever it comes from.” [p. 27]; “In 1920 and 1921 four of the States of the Commonwealth – Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania – passed Acts referring to the Parliament of the Commonwealth power to legislate with respect to air navigation.” [p. 35]; “However in dealing in this fashion with the suggestion that has been made I do not wish to be understood as throwing any doubt on the proposition that, pursuant to s. 51 (xxxvii) of the Constitution, a power may be referred for a fixed period.” [p. 38]; “The State has power and the Commonwealth has none, to prohibit or to authorize the carriage of passengers or goods by air between places within the State, but the Commonwealth has power to determine exclusively by what aircraft and by whom all commercial airline services shall be operated, including intra-State airline services which may be operated under State law, and in regs. 198 and 199 the Commonwealth has exercised that power.” [p. 55, earmarked]; “In my opinion, the Commonwealth has power to determine exclusively both by what aircraft and by whom all commercial, including intra-State commercial airline services where they can be operated under State law, shall be operated but the Commonwealth cannot authorise the inception or carrying on of an intra-State airline [.]” [p. 80, earmarked]; “I find no need in this case for any general discussion of the external affairs power. Some exposition of it is to be found in Burgess’ case (1) and The King v. Poole.” [p. 85]; “The establishment of these criteria in the United States has evoked in that country itself criticisms of which we would do well to take notice. It was Frankfurter J. who described them as “less than unwavering bright lines”: Baker v. Carr (8). One other quotation will be enough. I take it from the writings of Dr. Bernard Schwartz, Professor of Law at New York University : “Decisions like those just discussed illustrate the extent to which the Supreme Court has departed from the concept of dual federalism which had previously governed its approach to cases involving the relationship of federal and State authority. For the older view that the federal power over commerce could not be exercised over local transactions, which were within the exclusive area of State authority, has been substituted the notion of a plenary power of the national government over commerce. […]” The Australian union is one of dual federalism, and until the Parliament and the people see fit to change it, a true federation it must remain. This court is entrusted with the preservation of constitutional distinctions, and it both fails in its task and exceeds its authority if it discards them, however out of touch with practical conceptions or with modern conditions they may appear to be in some or all of their applications.” [p. 114 – 115]; “The extent of the legislative power conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by s. 51 (xxix.) was the subject of considerable discussion in The King v Burgess; Ex Parte Henry (1), in relation to the Paris Convention of 1919 and that case is the clear authority for the proposition that pursuant to that head of power Parliament may make laws to give effect to international obligations assumed by the Commonwealth by or pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation concluded at Chicago on 7th December 1944. As Starke J. said: “a law providing for the carrying out and giving effect to an international convention of this character concerns Australia’s relations and intercourse with other Powers or States and the rights and obligations which result, and is thus a law for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to external affairs” [pp. 125 – 126]; “The Commonwealth is a party to, and has ratified, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation concluded on 7th December 1944. Under the Constitution, s. 51 (xxix.) “External affairs”. When, as here, a party to litigation, and the Commonwealth supporting that party, rely upon s. 51 (xxix) to authorise the making of the Commonwealth law in question, it must appear to this Court that the law is for the carrying out of obligations of that description. It will be so if the law can fairly be regarded as providing a way of doing what the Commonwealth has undertaken to do ; the choice of ways and means being a matter essentially for Parliament.” [p. 136].