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Bookplate inserted; signed in black ink on front endpaper: “Robert Menzies 1916”. Highlights and marks in margins made in ink, including: [p. 16] “It is evident that laws take their place among the rules of conduct which ensure social order and intercourse. Therefore jurisprudence appears among social sciences within the section of so-called moral science”; [p. 23] “Nor is it a mere chance that in all European languages, except the English, the terms for law and right coincide – jus, recht, droit, diritto, derecho, pravo – all mean legal order, general rules of law, notion of right on one side, and the [p. 24] concrete right asserted by an individual on the other.”; [p. 28] “law is an enforceable rule of conduct […] execution [… p. 29] damages […] punishment […] nullity.”; [p. 30] “It has, for instance, [p. 31] been said of the Parliament of England that it may do anything except turn a man into a woman, or vice versa […] As for customary law, which is generally supposed to grow out of public opinion, jurists who follow Hobbes and Austin account for it by saying that so far as it has any legal application custom must be accepted by the State.”; [p. 33] “It is not difficult to discern the weak points of this doctrine. Surely, as has been urged by Sir H. Maine, the legal process cannot wait until a community has definitely established sovereign authority before it will recognize the existence of laws.”; [p. 35] “The truth seems to be that the basis of law is provided not by one-sided command, but by agreement.”; [p. 39] “Another difficulty arises from the position of international law. There is a set of rules recognized by the most powerful and civilized commonwealths of mankind and productive of innumerable consequences in practice; and yet the element of direct coercion is absent from them.”; [p. 40] “By reason of this absence of coercive sanction some jurists refuse to international law the attributes of law properly so-called, and look upon it merely as a form of positive morality.”; [p. 43, also earmarked] “Kant came to the conclusion that the aim of law is freedom, and that the fundamental process of law is the adjustment of one’s freedom to that of every other member of the community.”